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Abstract: In this paper I challenge the theoretical building blocks of agricultural economics and then 
provide some indication of how the discipline has rectified some of its shortcomings. The introduction of 
the New Institutional Economics into our discipline has been a major improvement. I have then argued that 
the challenges facing our profession are so huge that we need to think about further adaptation by making 
more use of other social sciences such as sociology and anthropology. This could help us understand the 
major complexities of dealing with the challenge of black economic empowerment in agriculture. This will 
however, also be necessary for us to adjust our research paradigm. This argument is well articulated by 
Doyer and Van Rooyen (2001) when they motivated a research method to study agribusiness supply chains. 
The challenges highlighted that for agricultural economic analysis to capture complex business reality and 
decisions to explain and predict the institutional and governance structures and optimal resource allocation 
behaviour of firms, approaches to research that combines positivist and constructivist are the most sensible. 
The combination of these approaches enables a holistic approach to the research problem.  Positivism’s 
strong explanatory and prediction capabilities are combined with the strong understanding and 
reconstructive capabilities of the constructivist approach. Throughout this process, qualitative and 
quantitative data can be used in combination. Since our research work also needs to focus more on 
structural and institutional issues it seems quite evident that we have to adopt a more eclectic research 
approach making much more use of case studies. The skills from the other social sciences will desperately 
be required here to advance our discipline into previously untreated terrain. This is necessary to make sure 





Agricultural Economic scholarship in Africa always had the luxury of problem solving and applied 
research. Living up to the challenges facing farmers, agribusiness and rural communities has ensured that 
our work remained relevant and focussed on the needs of our different countries, but took our time away 
from the “frontier-pushing” research and theoretical work of our colleagues in the US and Europe. In this 
sense agricultural economics in Africa often borrowed from these scholars and applied the models and 
methodologies to local problems.  
 
The influence from scholars from abroad has also highlighted what many of us perceived as limited 
quantitative skills and application in our discipline in Africa. The examples set by leading journals such as 
the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural 
Economics, World Development and Development and Cultural Change have put agricultural economists 
in most countries in Africa in pursuit of more quantitative and perceivably more ‘rigorous’ output. As a 
result there has been a continued jockeying for position in terms of the institution or researcher with the 
‘best’ analytical tools or models. This was despite the fact that data has always been a problem.  Analytical 
work and modelling in agricultural economics are often associated with ‘good’ or ‘solid’ and many of us 
fell in this trap by doing poor research and analysis but with seemingly good mathematics. This is often the 
problem with economists, which Bromley (1990) highlighted – we offer bad economics as being superior 
to politics. More ‘rigour’ (read math!) is often considered to mean more precision and more scientific and more value free and will therefore produce more respect and reward. But in order to do the mathematical 
analysis economists make many unrealistic assumptions in terms of the new classical economic paradigm.  
 
Parallel to the move towards greater rigour has been the increased application of the principles of the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) in agricultural economic research in Africa. Much of the research 
applications made use of the Transaction Cost Economics paradigm to explain economic behaviour, choice 
of organisation forms, etc.  
 
It is important to stress that the NIE is not only about transaction costs economics. It is a vast and relatively 
new multidisciplinary field that includes aspects of economics, history, sociology, political science, 
business organisation and law. In Kherallah and Kirsten (2002) I argue that the expansion of economics 
into these other social sciences has made NIE by definition a multidisciplinary field of study comprising 
several branches. It is the use of economic-type methods in politics where economists and political 
scientists have created the growing field of collective choice, and it is in the study of law that the ideas 
from economics led to the major field of “law and economics”. Economists’ ideas and methods also found 
their way into sociology, demography and into studies of the family and crime. Whereas economists 
traditionally studied prices, quantities and fluctuations, they now also study the governance structures and 
dispute-resolution mechanisms of societies. It is to these studies that the label “New Institutional 
Economics” is attached, but according to Olson and Kähkönen (2000) it sometimes also refers to the 
expansion of economics as a whole. The influence in other social sciences of the deductive methods of 
economists has been so far reaching that there is, in some sense, a theoretical integration of the social 
sciences under one overarching paradigm. Whether this new paradigm will be the new institutional 
economics, remains to be seen because there is still some debate as to what falls under the NIE banner.  
 
In the rest of the paper I am trying to go beyond the NIE as we know it and argue for further adjustments in 
the way we organise our agricultural economic “tool box”. Although I argue that the NIE is a fascinating 
and interesting development, we need to take stock and ask whether we are on the right track and whether 
we should not adopt other ideas, paradigms and principles and thoughts from other social sciences to 
address the challenges in African agriculture. This is the theme of the rest of the paper but first I need to 
remind us of the traditional critique against mainstream economics.  
 
2.  A critique of Mainstream Economics 
 
African agricultural economists – and for that matter most agricultural economists in the world – use the 
neo-classical and welfare economics (known as mainstream economics) as their reference framework. This 
is mainly due to the nature of their academic training and political orientation (Kassier and Kleynhans, 
1989). Consequently much of the theoretical building blocks of agricultural economics suffer the same 
problem as mainstream economics, i.e. being removed from reality. Although we have been doing work on 
relevant problems our approaches and research methodology suffer from assumptions and constructs that 
are not related to the way business and markets are actually working. The economic system is a complex 
network of markets, organizations, and contractual relationships. While neoclassical economic theory 
provides a sound basis for our understanding of market behaviour, our understanding of the economic 
system itself is under-informed due to a lack of systematic, theoretical analyses of how economic exchange 
is structured and how the surrounding institutional structures (legal, political, and social) affect those 
decisions.  
 
A series of papers in a recent issue of World Development (Harris, 2002; Jackson, 2002; White, 2002; and 
Kanbur, 2002) provide additional criticism by showing how mainstream economics, despite its 
considerable strengths is incapable on its own of adequately addressing central issues of development and 
how development analysis and policy would benefit greatly from treating other disciplines and 
methodological approaches as equal partners in tackling tough issues. The move to more quantitative 
analysis in agricultural economics makes the same critique also applicable to our discipline. There is still 
today the perception amongst (agricultural) economists that quantitative techniques provide more “rigor” 
than qualitative techniques. Hence it is often felt that economics, with its more rigorous footing, is a 
sounder basis on which to formulate policy advice (White, 2002). The point here is that quantitative 
analysis is possible given the models often rely on a set of simplifying assumptions such as that all agents pursue their short term interests, that market transactions are “arms-length” transactions, and the market 
transactions are impersonal (Kanbur, 2002; Milberg 2001).  The new classical economists often profess the 
concept of the ‘atomistic’ homo economicus and therefore ‘economic rationality’ to enable them to 
construct ‘models of the economic universe in the image of Newtonian mechanics’ (Fullbrook, 2002).     
 
Samuels (1997) provides an additional point of critique by arguing that some danger can be encountered 
when economists ignore process and mishandle interdependencies between endogenous and excluded 
variables. The main problem Samuels has with the application and use of mainstream economics in 
disciplinary  (basic and applied) or multi-disciplinary work of agricultural economists is that mainstream 
economic theory ignores the ‘process’ whereby a market mechanism move to equilibrium and how that 
changes. The point he is making (Samuels, 1997:229) is that the pursuit of determinate solutions has led 
economic analysts to substitute themselves for both actual economic actors and actual economic processes. 
What happens in reality by real economic actors are excluded and replaced by imaginary, often question-
begging and presumptuous constructions by the economic analysts. This constrains to a large extent the 
practical problem solving and subject matter or issue oriented work of agricultural economists.   
 
Much of the work of agricultural economists remains however applied mainstream determinate economics. 
Without further improvements, applications of mainstream equilibrium economics allow agricultural 
economists to do price analyses, supply and demand analyses, investment analyses, spatial analyses, 
comparative static analyses and linear programming. Glen Johnson (1997) also notes that there have been a 
number of extensions and improvements by agricultural economists to overcome the deficiencies of 
mainstream economics by developing theories through relaxing the assumptions of fixed populations and 
skills, technology and institutions. These include theories of human capital formation and induced technical 
and institutional change. Bacquet (1997) argues that agricultural economists have been successful in 
making improvements to mainstream economic theory, which increased our understanding of agricultural 
supply response, changes in demand factors for farm production and cash flow and bankruptcy problems of 
farmers. These and many other extensions of the mainstream theory are very useful. There is therefore 
tremendous scope for agricultural economists to do basic disciplinary work to remedy the deficiencies of 
mainstream economics that constrain the usefulness of economics of agricultural economics and limits the 
ability to tackle the real problems of agriculture and rural communities (Johnson, 1997). 
 
One example of such disciplinary improvements by economists has been the development of the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) and especially the application of the NIE in agricultural economics. NIE 
addresses some of the concerns and restrictive assumptions of standard new classical economic theory  
(mainstream economics) and acknowledges the important role of institutions, but argues that one can 
analyse institutions within the framework of neoclassical economics. In other words, under NIE, some of 
the unrealistic assumptions of neo-classical economics (such as perfect information, zero transaction costs, 
full rationality) are relaxed, but the assumption of self-seeking individuals attempting to maximize an 
objective function subject to constraints still holds. Furthermore, institutions are incorporated as an 
additional constraint under the NIE framework. As Langlois (1986, p.5) puts it, “the problem with many of 
the early institutionalists is that they wanted an economics with institutions but without theory; the problem 
with many neo-classicists is that they want economic theory without institutions; what the New 
Institutional Economics tries to do is provide an economics with both theory and institutions.” 
 
The changes in agricultural and food markets have also led to a situation where we now find economic 
actors engaging in transactions rather than a large number of atomistic firms constituting a ‘market’. This 
renders a limited applicability of mainstream economics due to its assumptions of homogeneity and 
rationality. This also has major implications of how we analyse the problems of market access. It is these 
types of problems that can only be addressed by the extensions of the neo-classical economic theory such 
as the New Institutional Economics. 
 
Technological advances, specialization and the rise of impersonal exchange in the late 1800s increased 
transaction costs in the market place. One aspect from this is the increasing uncertainty about product 
quality, which increases the likelihood of moral hazard and adverse selection problems as illustrated by 
Akerlof’s (1970) ‘lemons problem’. In the market for foods the ‘lemons’ problem manifested itself in the 
adulteration (cheapening) and false representation of food products. The applications of the principles of NIE provide us with an understanding why there is a need for increased co-ordination. As a result of the 
demands from consumers for tailored foods and food safety processors/marketers have avoided traditional 
spot markets and have engaged in more direct market channels such as market and production contracts, 
full ownership or vertical integration. These more personal relations and transactions are best analysed by 
applying the principles of NIE.  
 
It should however be indicated that the NIE is also not without its flaws. In much of the NIE and 
specifically in the transaction cost economics (TCE) paradigm the ‘transaction’ is the unit of analysis. The 
problem is though that the TCE analysis has limited relevance to those that are not in the market – those 
that are still not able to make a transaction. Traditional transaction cost applications would thus not help us 
much but we still need to find policy and business solutions for the problem.  
 
For sociologists the rational choice tendency still contained in transaction costs economics, remains a major 
problem. Sociologists are critical about the fact that economists attribute human interaction to individual 
rationality and are abstracting away from fundamental aspects of social relationships that characterise 
economic as well as other actions (Richter, 2001).   
 
To conclude this section I return to the concept of ‘self-interest’ that drives rational behaviour. Self-interest 
seeking behaviour of individuals link up with the concept of  ‘economic man’ discussed earlier and 
assumes that individuals act to maximise profit or maximise utility. In an environment of perfect 
information the standard theory shows us that the economy will through the working of the ‘invisible hand’ 
achieve a competitive equilibrium. But the main defect of a strictly competitive market (even if it can be 
realised) is its severe moral weaknesses. For even if competitive markets were to produce efficient 
outcomes (which is highly unlikely), these efficient outcomes would in all probability not be justifiable and 
also fail to coincide with the allocation that society as a collectivity prefers on the basis of its definition of 
social welfare as expressed through the democratic process. In an environment of asymmetric information 
it might be that people are constantly looking for opportunities to steal and to cheat. It is only penalties and 
sanctions that prevent individuals from doing so. We can therefore understand why Okun (1975) argued 
that “…the market needs to be kept in its place ... [because] given the chance, it would sweep away all 
other values, and establish a vending machine society”. 
 
It is very easy to adopt the model of uncompromising ‘economic man’ but Ben-Ner and Putterman (2000) 
argue that this will ignore the realistic complexities in human behaviour and psychology. They argue that 
there is no scientific basis for the assumption that self-interest or own-well-being is the only concern of 
individuals. Ben-Ner and Putterman (2000) list evidence from evolutionary biology and other social and 
behavioural sciences that suggest individual human beings may be genetically inclined toward concern not 
only with their own success but also with the success of their offspring and other kin. It is further suggested 
that individuals will be inclined toward co-operation with others. These are some of the arguments Ben-Ner 
and Putterman use to show that values of people matter in economics and that it should be endogenised in 
economic analyses. Ben-Ner and Putterman argue therefore that human values could be an important force 
to keep “the market in place”. This is contrary to Okun’s (1975) plea for democratic capitalism where the 
state has to play a role in such a process. 
 
The subject of values was once considered to lie beyond the purview of economic science but industrial 
civilisation has now a rising anxiety over it social health and cohesion and now we see the subject of values 
seeping into economic discourse. The work of Ben-Ner and Putterman (2000) is one of the more recent 
pieces of literature highlighting this trend. In addition the recent World Food and Agribusiness Forum 
hosted in the Netherlands in June 2002 had “Food Chains: Connecting value with values” as its theme. 
Here the values of ecology and ethics and social accountability were discussed and suddenly values have 
now also entered the business arena. A further illustration of the increasing importance of ‘values’ is the 
discussion and agenda points during the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg. 
It is clear that more changes in economics are on the cards and it could be that economics would become a 
much ‘softer’ and humane science thereby getting rid of the label of ‘dismal science’. 
 
3.  Beyond the New Institutional Economics: Elements of a New Paradigm for Agricultural 
Economists  
The discussion immediately above provided an overview of the standard (and recently expanded critique) 
of mainstream economic theory and in the process I have already alluded to some extensions of the 
standard theory. In this section I take this argument further and debate the elements from other social 
sciences that could be applied to ensure that we as agricultural economists are in a position to address the 
challenges facing agriculture in Africa. It is therefore appropriate to consider this first in order to provide 
the context in which to debate the appropriateness of our current conventional wisdom. 
  
It will probably not be difficult to develop a long list of challenges and issues that will influence the work 
of agricultural economists. To name a few: 
•  The agricultural issues emanating from the world summit on sustainable development.  
•  Rural poverty 
•  The agricultural agenda for a successful implementation of the new partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) 
•  Food security 
•  The Doha round of world trade negotiations and the broader issues of globalisation  
•  The competitiveness of African agriculture. 
 
For me to discuss all of these would not be proper because it will take another paper to do justice to all of 
them. I will briefly run through the issues related to the challenge for agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa 
since it relates very well to the challenge facing NEPAD. The discussion of these challenges will then lead 
us into the critical assessment of our agricultural economics paradigm. 
 
Pro-poor agricultural growth in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Within sub-Saharan Africa 70% of the poor are in rural areas. Alleviating poverty is thus a major challenge 
requiring interventions to stimulate to political development and economic development. In the literature 
there is a general consensus that in many of the poor rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa increasing 
agricultural productivity will have the greatest potential for poverty-reducing growth, either through direct 
benefits, indirect expenditure linkages or through local consumer benefits. The argument is also that via 
linkages, growth in the non-farm economy is the most vibrant when farming is thriving. Successful 
agricultural development will stimulate diversification in the non-farm rural economy. Despite this 
consensus agricultural growth in sub-Saharan Africa has been disappointingly slow and years of 
interventions by donors and governments had very little impact. Despite the agreement on agriculture’s 
importance we have seen over the years that agriculture’s share of government and development agency 
investments have been falling. This paradox is what Dorward et al (2002) call the “agricultural investment 
dilemma”. These authors also argue that the policy prescriptions for Africa embedded in what they call the 
‘Washington Consensus on Agriculture’(WCA)
1 are partly responsible for this problem in African 
agriculture. The basic policy prescriptions emerging from the Washington Consensus are essentially based 
on recommendations of decentralisation, deregulation and market liberalisation
2. A key requirement 
according to the WCA is agricultural systems intensification implying increased productivity through 
increased technology. Other elements include: 
 
•  Expansion of production in non-traditional crops 
•  Improvement in economy wide policies – mainly through structural adjustment programmes. 
•  Reviewing barriers to entry in input markets 
•  Land reform and secure property rights 
•  Reforms on tax policy is needed 
                                                 
1 The Washington Consensus refers to a set of analyses and prescriptions considered being World 
Bank/IMF orthodoxy. The Washington Consensus on Agriculture is extracted from reports by the World 
Bank, UNECA, IFPRI and more recently the IFAD 2001 poverty report. This section is a largely summary 
from the arguments in Kydd and Dorward (2001) and Dorward et al (2002).   
2 The flaws in these policy recommendations for many developing countries are well articulated in the 
controversial book by Stiglitz (2002). •  Better government services in the delivery of public goods and services 
•  A challenge to OECD governments to reform their agricultural policies to reduce distortion in world 
commodity markets. 
 
Although many of these prescriptions can be applauded there remain a number of gaps and inconsistencies 
mainly in terms of institutional analysis (Dorward, et al. 2002). Very little is said about institutions 
(specifically related to agricultural finance for poor farmers). In addition the WCA writers tend to overstate 
the advantages of smallholders without taking account of disadvantages smallholders will face in 
liberalised global markets. 
 
The critique by authors such as Stiglitz (2002), Dorward et al (2002) and Kanbur (1999) is much related to 
the point of poor institutional analysis. Liberalisation policies and institutional changes are often 
recommended without taking account of the particular country’s systemic approach to dealing with 
economic co-ordination problems.  
 
To unpack this point we need to distinguish between different forms of capitalism (or different sets of 
institutions). For our purposes it is sufficient to distinguish between the version of the British-American 
(BA) world that is based on, and legitimised by, the ideology of liberal capitalism and the version of 
Continental European (CE) countries that is based on, and legitimised by, the ideology of social democracy 
(Terreblanche, 2002). In their book ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ Hall and Soskice (2001) make a comparable 
but very interesting distinction between the institutional framework of the liberal market economies (LME) 
– Britain and America – and that of the Co-ordinated Market Economies (CME) of continental Europe. In 
the liberal market economies, firms co-ordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and competitive 
market arrangements with market relationships characterised by arm’s length exchange of goods and 
services in a context of competition and formal contracting.  In co-ordinated market economies there is a 
greater prevalence of non-market relationships to co-ordinate endeavours with other actors and to construct 
their core competencies. These non-market modes of co-ordination general entail more extensive relational 
or incomplete contracting, network monitoring based on the exchange of private information inside 
networks and more reliance on collaborative relationships. 
 
It is evident from most of the WCA writings that the recommended institutional changes always resemble 
the institutional framework for most of the liberal market economies (LME) such as Britain and the United 
States of America. This as well as the links with the previous colonial masters and the main donors has 
resulted in most of the developing countries in the Poor South (as well as countries that were previously 
part of the Soviet Union) including Anglo-Phone Africa, imitating the LME or liberal capitalism model.  It 
is, however, debatable whether that model really suits the developmental needs of these countries. (Is this 
perhaps why lagging countries will never catch-up?). We can make a strong case that if these countries 
were to adopt the social democratic version of democratic capitalism, their developmental needs would be 
much better served. This links to the point Kydd (2002) makes that despite the fact that LME institutional 
framework can be very effective in certain cases it is true that in many cases it would not apply and be 
relevant in many other countries.  
 
Polanyi (quoted by Boyer, 1997) demonstrates in his classic 1946 work, ‘The Great Transformation’, that 
most markets for commodities call for highly sophisticated institutional arrangements for their efficiency 
and self-adjusting property to be obtained.  This again strongly argues the case against  liberal  market 
ideologies.    
  
Boyer (1997) argues that there is a need for institutional transition and organizational innovations that will 
provide a significant but ancillary role to markets, provided they are embedded in a set of social relations 
providing trust, loyalty and commitment. Without these basic ingredients markets will not be efficient. 
 
Kydd (2002) continues this line of argument and makes a very strong case that the LME institutions are not 
appropriate for the development of smallholder agriculture in Africa and it would therefore be unlikely that 
agriculture would perform its pro-poor role. Thus the institutional challenges required by liberalisation 
measures within the WCA may be ‘taking poor farmers down a blind alley’. For poor farmers in Africa the 
key challenge is to devise institutional arrangements, which are able to reduce transaction costs and also induce much stronger commitment to investing in needed specific (and co-specific) assets. Kydd therefore 
argues that the characteristics of poor farmers are such that the liberal capitalistic (LME) institutional 
framework is unable to solve the very particular co-ordination problems that arise. This notion that the 
market (central to the liberal ideology) is not always (and especially not in developing countries) the most 
efficient institutional form for economic co-ordination, is supported by many other scholars (see 
Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) for a discussion on this). From this it is concluded that CME-type 
institutions tend to be more appropriate and needed to develop smallholder agriculture in Africa. Ideally 
these would be based on deliberative institutions, working horizontally inside a sector and also vertically 
along the supply chain to ensure a just and fair outcome.  
 
Implications for the agricultural economics paradigm 
 
All these arguments have important implications on how we as agricultural economists get involved in 
policy prescriptions for the development of agriculture in Africa. It is critical that policy be developed on 
the basis of an understanding of what are likely to be broad outlines of appropriate institutional 
arrangements, i.e. arrangements that will be transactions cost reducing and specific asset investment 
inducing. The question is whether this is enough to make a meaningful difference. The bottom line is that 
our research on poverty and the agricultural development challenge in Africa needs to be institutionally 
informed. The challenge is to be able to provide insights on how to design non-standard institutional 
arrangements, non-market co-ordination and the role of government.  
 
In the final instance it is important that our institutional analysis take cognisance of the fact that the 
institutions of a country or a region are embedded in the culture in which their logic are symbolically 
grounded, organisationally structured and politically defended. All the different institutions and structures 
of a country are integrated into a nation’s social configuration (influenced by culture, history) to shape the 
social system of production (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). The argument is this that the way a nation 
organises its economic activity and how transactions are taking place is a function of culture and society. 
Thus it is important that we be sensitive to the social context in which transactions are embedded and that 
we understand the degree to which social bonds exist between transacting actors.  Given that there is a large 
array of institutional arrangements for effectively organising modern societies, the challenge for us in the 
African context is to find, and understand, the institutional arrangements that will deliver viable economic 
performances.   
 
4.  The Case for New Ideas and New Principles? 
 
In light of changing circumstances in world agriculture and agricultural markets as result of the process of 
agricultural industrialisation there is the danger that small farmers will be marginalised and excluded from 
high value markets (Reardon and Barret, 2000). Poor farmers from disadvantaged regions on the continent 
face a double challenge to enter a very competitive and deregulated domestic market as well as having to 
deal with the challenges posed by the process of agricultural industrialisation. It is therefore a major 
challenge in Africa to prevent marginalisation and exclusion of poor farmers and to find ways to link small 
growers to high value markets.  
 
The only way empowerment of these farmers could take place is to ensure some form of linkage with 
agribusiness (including traders, market agents and the traditional range of value adding enterprises in the 
food chain), which will secure market access for them on a sustainable basis. 
 
Some earlier efforts by parastatal development corporations and some agribusinesses to open agricultural 
markets for poor rural communities are commendable but the challenge is so huge that much more needs to 
be done. Improving on-farm productivity for increased sales could be one way of stimulating commercial 
activity and thereby linking them to markets. However our experience with development efforts over the 
years has clearly shown that this approach is not sufficient because access to markets (and finance) seems 
to be more important for economic success. Poor developed links with markets (and thus with agribusiness 
per definition) have reduced incentives in agriculture to such an extent that farmers in many cases have 
abandoned farming activities. This has been a major problem not only amongst farmers of perishable 
commodities such as dairy, fruits and vegetables but also amongst grains, oilseeds and beef. The lack of market access is often attributed to poor infrastructure and communication. But sometimes it is just poor 
quality or quite often lack of trust that creates the perception that these farmers’ products do not comply 
with the basic minimum requirements in order for it to be sold. 
 
Non-market co-ordination mechanisms 
 
The background and context provided immediately above provides enough justification for the ideas on the 
changes in thinking with regard to institutional analysis that is required for more appropriate institutional 
design to solve the problems of smallholders. The implication of looking at institutions that are more non-
market orientated requires that we need to take note of a number of aspects that need to become part of our 
‘tool box’ to help us putting these institutional arrangements together. 
 
Given the context and the understanding that the market will not provide a satisfactory outcome we will 
have many more personal transactions, between big business and small farmers and between different 
cultures. There would be very few at arms-length transactions. This is partly a function of poor market 
access but also a function of the change in food markets and the need for stricter co-ordination. So what are 
the new ideas we need to take note of in order to deal with this challenge? 
 The new economic sociology and the concept of intersubjectivity 
 
Following on the critique of the homo economicus and the atomostic agent provided earlier, it is necessary 
that we realise that in dealing with the problem of empowerment we work with different agents  - non-
atomistic and non-homogenous agents. Each agent is shaped and influenced by social, cultural and 
economic structures and this needs to be analysed and understood. There is a strong interface between the 
individual and society confirming the point earlier that economic agents are socially embedded. So what we 
are arguing is that individuals are not acting individually but act socially or as members of a group. Davis 
(2001) therefore introduces the concept of the socially-embedded agent by showing how individuals and 
their institutions and social values influence one another. So when different agents with different social 
values engage in transactions this could provide interesting challenges for the selection of the co-ordinating 
mechanism to ensure an efficient outcome. 
 
In mainstream economics it is considered that individual actors (or agents) make independent decisions and 
are uninfluenced by other actors. In sociology other actors influence actors. As economist began to 
recognise that actors are influenced by other actors as described earlier we see economics infiltrating 
sociology under the banner of NIE (Richter, 2001). The New Economic Sociology (NES) paradigm was the 
response from the sociologists to this infiltration. The NES again take onboard the concept of 
embeddedness discussed earlier by arguing that ‘economic action takes place within the networks of social 
relations that make up the social structure’. 
 
The NES is critical of the naïve construct of the NIE by only focusing on transaction costs. They argue that 
issue of power, trust, embeddednes, social relationships and networks are much more important – 
especially in the African context we where we have inequality in (economic) power. The NIE, as we 
mentioned earlier still focus on economic rationality and ignore issues such as fairness, trust or power. If 
we just look at how business is done today in Africa a lot relies on sociality and friendship or just plain 
good contacts you have made through related activities, such as the church, society, sport, etc. Getting into 
the ‘social network’ is not easy for those not sharing the same society and the same culture and these actors 
are thus often excluded from business deals. The role of culture in economic behaviour should therefore be 
more understood. 
 
A number of the concepts from sociology such as power, fairness, social networks, altruism and status can 
become very useful when we have to analyse and provide solutions to the process of economic 
empowerment.  
 
Social capital and trust 
 
Social capital is also a term that is borrowed from Sociology and has become of increasing interest to 
economists (Peterson, Robison and Siles, 1999) to explain choices that are made outside the market and 
that were previously not addressed by neo-classical economics. Robert Putnam’s (1993) work on social 
capital also falls within this framework, but social capital is also incorporated in transaction cost economics 
as an important element to cut-down on the costs and uncertainty of market exchange thereby increasing 
the efficiency of transactions. Social capital refers to social connections or networks, norms and trust, all of 
which can facilitate co-operation in society and ultimately have effects on economic performance (Putnam, 
1993; Ensminger 2000).  It is now increasingly being recognised that social connections and networks 
should be studied to explain economic behaviour and organisation.  
 
Social capital consists of relationships found in social structure that are appropriable for productive use by 
an actor. Peterson, Robison and Siles, (1999) adopt the definition of Robison, Schmid and Siles (1999): 
‘social capital is the sympathy or sense of obligation that a person or group receives from another person or 
group that may produce a potential benefit, advantage, or preferential treatment from that other person or 
group beyond that which might be expected in a selfish exchange relationship’. Under this notion of social 
capital, the basis for mutual interest is the sympathy of obligation of one transacting partner for the other. 
The origin is the social connectedness of the two parties and from self-interest or authority. The potential of 
social capital is that each partner will forego opportunistic behaviour and thereby lowering transaction 
costs. Krug and Polos (2000) also argue that the building of social capital is seen as urgent and crucial investment for new firms where the building of personal relations is more crucial for the survival of a firm 
than direct access to resources. Here again we emphasise the importance of social networks for successful 
business and thus successful economic empowerment. 
 
The issue of social capital becomes very important in trying to understand and analyse the many failed 
empowerment initiatives and failed transactions and linkages between agribusiness and poor farmers in 
Africa. These initiatives or transactions often performed poorly because of cultural misunderstandings, 
suspicion, limited attempts to create effective interpersonal relationships, missed opportunities to 
understand the nuances of communication, friendship and partnership. Or sometimes it is just a general lack 
of understanding of how business is done. 
 
The concept of social capital therefore gives an underlying rationale to the importance of studying culture 
and relationships in our empirical work. This is even more true in the multi-cultural context of South 
African agriculture and also within the context of our historical legacy where mistrust between different 
groups have been the order of the day. 
 
In terms of the concept of social capital we can argue that trust is the single most important aspect. It is 
recognised that trust seems essential to commercial transactions that are not fully controlled by either legal 
constraints of contracts or the economic forces of markets. From the literature it also appears that trust 
plays an important part in the formation of relationships. There is literature that links trust with transaction 
costs by arguing that when exchanges take place in an atmosphere of trust, transactions are less costly to 
complete. There are now many initiatives in Africa from donors, agribusiness and economic consultants to 
build linkages and to make agricultural commodity markets work for the poor. I would argue that the 
building of social capital is a crucial prerequisite for success in these efforts. 
 
How do we build social capital? Peterson, Robison and Siles (1999) argue that this can be done through 
repeated transactions between partners. During the transactions expressions of friendship, common values, 
common goals and mutual respect would all be appropriate for building social capital. Establishing trust 
will be the key to building social capital. On the other hand trust is an act that evidences the existence of 
social capital in a relationship. High trust relationships between partners result in less searching for 
alternative partners, more commitment, etc. 
 
Direct social capital – mentioned here – takes much time and effort to create due to the fact that a lot of 
attention should be paid on trust over many personal interactions and many economic transactions. Indirect 
social capital arises from ones reputation for trusting relationship with others (Peterson, Robison and Siles, 
1999). 
 
5. Synthesis: The Case for Cross-Disciplinarity 
 
The above arguments probably presented a number of fairly foreign and probably provocative ideas. My 
basic point is that if we as agricultural economists want to become useful by making a contribution to the 
process of agricultural development we need to make some adaptations. First of all we need to urgently 
start questioning our standard recipes and policy prescriptions for agricultural development, which to my 
mind is largely based on the British-American philosophy of liberal capitalism. The question is whether 
this approach to development is relevant and appropriate for our circumstances and for our challenges. 
 
I have also made the case for some important sole searching amongst our profession to show a much 
greater interest and activity in the two main challenges I have singled out in this paper. Some new values 
and understanding of the principles of humanity and dignity is urgently needed. 
 
Finally, I have made the case for agricultural economists to focus on the strengths of sociology, 
anthropology and political analysis in order to be better equipped to tackle the challenge of agricultural 
development in Africa. The point that was made throughout this paper is that economic theory sacrifices far 
too much relevance in its pursuit of ever-greater rigour. Given the challenges, we need to see stronger 
efforts to integrate the building of theory in economics with the study of reality. Here some contributions 
from the other social sciences could be very helpful (Harriss, 2002).  
Harris (2002) and Kanbur (2002) make useful arguments to illustrate how cross-disciplinarity (defined as 
the analysis and methods of more than one discipline) and the combination of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches can be used to inform policy on development and poverty alleviation much better. These are the 
challenges in African agriculture and one can thus make the same case for applications in our profession. 
Kanbur (2002) warn however that cross-disciplinarity is not easy and there is the danger that we could only 
pick-up the weaknesses instead of the strengths of each discipline. There are already examples of works 
applying the principles of cross-disciplinarity or interdisciplinarity. A case in point is Mantzavinos’ (2001) 
book on ‘Individuals, Institutions, and Markets’ in which he integrates the latest scholarship in economics, 
sociology, political science, law, and anthropology to offer a theory of how the institutional framework of a 
society emerges and how markets work within those institutions. These are interesting developments and I 
look forward to see how we could apply these principles in agricultural economic scholarship in Africa. 
 
6. Conclusion: Implications for Research Methodology and Approaches in Agricultural Economics 
 
In this paper I challenged the theoretical building blocks of agricultural economics and then provide some 
indication of how the discipline has rectified some of its shortcomings. The introduction of the New 
Institutional Economics into our discipline has been a major improvement. I have then argued that the 
challenges facing our profession is so huge that we need think about further adaptation by making more use 
of other social sciences such as sociology and anthropology. This could help us understand the major 
complexities of dealing with the challenge of black economic empowerment in agriculture. This will 
however also be necessary for us to adjust our research paradigm. This argument is well articulated by 
Doyer and Van Rooyen (2001) when they motivated a research method to study agribusiness supply chains: 
 
‘ … the complexity of the business and institutional environments facing business firms in the new global 
economy extend beyond the scope of neo-classical resource allocation economics and should be augmented 
by a holistic application of various economic theories from a constructivist paradigm.  Conventional 
agricultural economic analysis is bound by the positivistic inquiry paradigm. This paradigm approaches 
reality with in a deterministic view where clear and linear assumptions apply’. 
 
Given the challenges I highlighted earlier and the challenge for agricultural economic analysis to capture 
complex business reality and decisions to explain and predict the institutional and governance structures 
and optimal resource allocation behaviour of firms, makes the combination of a positivist and constructivist 
approaches to research quite sensible.  The combination of these approaches enables a holistic approach to 
the research problem.  Positivism’s strong explanatory and prediction capabilities are combined with the 
strong understanding and reconstructive capabilities of the constructivist approach. Throughout this process 
qualitative and quantitative data can be used in combination as we have argued earlier.   
 
Since our research work also needs to focus more on structural and institutional issues it seems quite 
evident that we have to adopt a more eclectic research approach making much more use of case studies. 
The skills from the other social sciences will desperately be required here to advance our discipline into 
previously untreated terrain. This is necessary to make sure we make the important contribution to the most 
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